Conviviality by Design by Caire, Patrice et al.
Conviviality by Design
Patrice Caire 1 and Antonis Bikakis 2 and Vasileios Efthymiou 3
Abstract. With the pervasive development of socio-
technical systems, such as Facebook, Twitter and digital
cities, modelling and reasoning on social settings has acquired
great significance. Hence, an independent soft objective of sys-
tem design is to facilitate interactions. Conviviality has been
introduced as a social science concept for multiagent systems
to highlight soft qualitative requirements like user friendliness
of systems. Roughly, more opportunity to work with other
people increases the conviviality. In this paper, the question
we address is how to design systems to increase conviviality by
design. To evaluate conviviality, we model agent interactions
using dependence networks, and define measures that quan-
tify interdependence over time. To illustrate our approach we
use a gaming example. Though, our methods can be applied
similarly to any type of agent systems, which involve human
or artificial agents cooperating to achieve their goals.
1 Introduction
As software systems gain in complexity and become more and
more intertwined with the human social environment, models
that can express the social characteristics of complex systems
are increasingly needed [13, 8, 16]. For example, people may
live far apart, speak different languages and have never physi-
cally met, but still, they expect to interact electronically with
each other as they do physically. Hence, an implicit soft objec-
tive of system design is often to facilitate interactions. Con-
viviality emerges, but we want to design systems that foster
conviviality among people or devices [18].
So far, most systems let users find their own ways to cooper-
ate without providing any help or support. In such cases, users
have to coordinate their actions and cooperate in a distributed
way. Without any support from the system, they are not able
to evaluate their cooperation and therefore the conviviality
of the system; consequently they also cannot find ways to in-
crease it. Conviviality is more than mere cooperation; it gives
agents the freedom to chose with whom to cooperate.
Our proposed approach follows an alternative direction. It
is based on the intuition that, to be convivial, the system
itself should provide its users with potential ways to cooper-
ate. For example, the system may suggest to the employees
of a company, possible ways of interaction that will improve
their cooperation. The system may monitor the evolution of
these interactions, evaluate the agents’ cooperation, and up-
date the suggestions it makes to increase conviviality. Our
research question is the following:
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Research Question: How to, by design, increase convivi-
ality in multiagent systems?
This breaks down into the following sub-questions:
(a) How to evaluate conviviality?
(b) How to measure conviviality over time?
(c) What are the assumptions and requirements for such
measures?
(d) How to use the measures in MAS?
In agent systems, conviviality measures quantify interde-
pendence in social relations, representing the degree to which
the system facilitates social interactions. Roughly, more in-
terdependence increases conviviality among groups of agents
or coalitions, whereas larger coalitions may decrease the effi-
ciency or stability of these involved coalitions. We are, there-
fore, interested in two main issues. The first one is to design
multiagent systems so that they foster conviviality, while the
second one is to evaluate conviviality. For the first issue we
adopt the paradigm of dependence networks, based on the
intuition that conviviality may be represented by the interde-
pendence among the agents of the system. For evaluating con-
viviality over time, we build on the static measures originally
introduced in [4]. We extend these measures by proposing new
ones, that we call temporal case.
In this paper, we build on the notion of social dependence
introduced by Castelfranchi [7]. Castelfranchi brings concepts
like groups and collectives from social theory to agent theory
to enrich agent theory and develop experimental, conceptual
and theoretical new instruments for social sciences.
Moreover, we take as a starting point the notion of depen-
dence graphs and dependence networks initially elaborated
by Conte and Sichman [20], and Conte et al. [21], and further
developed by these authors [20].
We build on the Temporal Dependence Networks, intro-
duced in [5] to compare time sequences of different depen-
dence networks. This time however, we model the potential
evolutions of sequences within the same dependence network.
We introduce three principles to define three new measures,
and therefore compare conviviality in Temporal Dependence
Networks in a macro- and micro-organizational scale.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First,
we introduce our motivating example, highlighting the main
challenges. Then, we identify requirements for convivial sys-
tem design measures. We introduce our temporal dependence
networks measures and principles. Finally, we present some of
the most related works and summarize this paper.
2 Example Scenario
In order to demonstrate the requirements and challenges of
conviviality among heterogeneous agents, we use an example
scenario from the domain of social networks. This example al-
lows us to compare different instances of a game and illustrate
how the system may increase the conviviality by evaluating
the games against a number of conviviality principles.
Consider a game in Facebook, in which different users form
teams and cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. We
assume the members of each team to be completely unknown
to each other (they are not Facebook friends and they have no
friends in common), and that the game allows only one-to-one
interactions between team members. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we also assume that each team must consist of the same
number of players. The game consists in finding answers to
questions involving information that is available in the pub-
lic profiles of the team members. The game unfolds in three
different phases, and for each phase there is one associated
problem in the form of a question/answer to be solved.
For the first phase, the question (Q1) is: “Which team mem-
ber has the most in common with the others?”. For example,
in a five-member team A: Alice, Bob, Carlo, Dimitra and
Eve, it could be that Eve has common interests with Alice
in tennis, with Carlo in Spanish movies, and with Dimitra in
ancient history. Alice and Dimitra have a common interest in
climbing, and Bob and Carlo are both interested in football.
For team A, the correct answer would be ‘Eve”.
The second phase question (Q2) is: “Which country corre-
sponds to both the picture uploaded by answer of Q1 (Eve) and
one (and one only) of the team members?”. For our team A,
the correct answer would be “Greece” based on the fact that
Eve has uploaded a photo, which was taken in Athens, and
Dimitra is the only team member that comes from Greece.
The last question (Q3) is: “What is the place among the
answers provided to Q2 that most team members prefer?
(Greece). The answer would be “Santorini”, which is “liked”
by Alice, Dimitra and Eve, while other places in Greece, such
as Athens or Crete, are “liked” only by two of the team mem-
bers.
The team that manages to solve the riddles faster than the
other teams is the winner. Building on instances of the game,
we analyze how the system may increase the conviviality of
the game by evaluating it against proposed principles.
Winning such a game requires finding the proper ways to
cooperate, and assessing the team’s performance by evaluat-
ing conviviality. In brief, the challenges of this game are:
1. Cooperation. If one of the team members does not coop-
erate, this would probably mean that the team may not be
able to answer a question, and consequently win the game.
The challenge, here, is to enable and foster cooperation be-
tween the team players.
2. Evaluation of conviviality. This process will help the
team assess its performance in each round of the game, and
find ways to improve it. For example, if team A could not
provide an answer to Q1, because there were not enough
interactions between the team members, the team should
be able to realise the reasons for their poor performance and
find ways to improve it for the next rounds. The challenge,
in this case, is to develop principled methods for measuring
the conviviality among the team members.
3 Hypotheses and requirements
To represent agents’ interdependencies we use dependence
networks [9, 19, 2], differentiating static and temporal cases.
3.1 Static case
In this case, all interdependencies are modelled in a single
“global” dependence network, as in [9, 19, 2]. We consider
that the agents’ goals and interdependencies have been identi-
fied using a goal-oriented method like Tropos [3], for instance.
Abstracting from method-specific concepts (e.g. tasks and re-
sources in Tropos), we define a dependence network as in [4]:
Definition 3.1 (Dependence network) A dependence
network (DN) is a tuple 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 where: A is a set of
agents, G is a set of goals, dep : A × A → 2G is a function
that relates with each pair of agents, the sets of goals on which
the first agent depends on the second, and ≥: A → 2G × 2G
is for each agent a total pre-order on sets of goals occurring
in his dependencies: G1 >(a) G2.
To illustrate our definition, we consider that during the first
phase of the game, only A and B interact to answer Q1; during
phase 2, B and C interact as well as D and C; and during
phase 3, B and E interact as well as D and E, and A and
E. Figure 1 depicts a dependence network that captures this
situation. The nodes A,B,C,D and E represent agents Alice,
Bob, Carlo, Dimitra and Eve. The arrows indicate the goal
dependencies (i.e. ask a question or reply to it). A number of
coalitions are formed among the five agents, such as (A,E),
(A,B,E) and (A,B,C,D,E).
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Figure 1. Example of a dependence network.
Based on [4], we make the following hypotheses:
H1 the cycles identified in a dependence network are consid-
ered as coalitions. These coalitions are used to evaluate
conviviality in the network. Cycles are the smallest graph
topology expressing interdependence, thereby conviviality,
and are therefore considered atomic relations of interdepen-
dence. When referring to cycles, we are implicitly signifying
simple cycles, i.e., where all nodes are distinct [10]; we also
discard self-loops. When referring to conviviality, we always
refer to potential interaction not actual interaction.
H2 conviviality in a dependence network is evaluated in a
bounded domain, i.e., over a [0, 1] interval. This allows the
comparison of different systems in terms of conviviality.
H3 larger coalitions have more conviviality.
H4 the more coalitions in the dependence network, the higher
the conviviality measure (ceteris paribus).
Our top goal is to maximize conviviality in the multiagent
system. Some coalitions provide more opportunities for their
participants to cooperate than others, being thereby more
convivial. Our two sub-goals (or requirements) are thus:
R1 maximize the size of the agent’s coalitions, i.e. to maximize
the number of agents involved in the coalitions,
R2 maximize the number of these coalitions.
3.2 Temporal Case
For more fine-grained exploration, the network can be divided
up into sequences, and analysis performed on each sequence.
This allows for local analysis of the network and is less compu-
tationally intensive. Definition 3.2 formalizes how dependence
networks can be extended to capture the temporal evolution
of dependencies between agents, inspired from [5].
Definition 3.2 (Temporal dependence network) A
temporal dependence network (TDN) is a tuple 〈A,G,T , dep〉
where: A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals, T is a set of
natural numbers denoting the time units or sequence number,
dep : T × A × A → 2G is a function that relates with each
triple of a sequence number, and two agents, the set of goals
on which the first agent depends on the second.
Returning to our example, the static view illustrated Fig-
ure 1 is now captured as a sequence in Figure 2. If we call
the temporal dependence network TDNk, TDN
j
k denotes the
individual dependence network that corresponds to the jth
step. Note that |A|, the number of agents (5 in this case),
remains constant over TDNk. |TDNk| refers to the length of
the temporal dependence network (3 in this case).
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Figure 2. Example of a temporal dependence network.
Building on the static case, our assumptions are:
H5 the more regularly the number of coalitions increases, the
higher the conviviality measure (ceteris paribus); for ex-
ample, in human society, allowing people to get to know
each other progressively enables trust to build up. In cases,
where agents need to quickly form a grand coalition with-
out build up, and dissolve, the assumptions may differ.
H6 the more different agents take part in coalitions, the higher
the conviviality (ceteris paribus); for example, by allowing
all agents to participate in interactions.
Our two additional requirements are thus:
R3 maximize the regular increment of the number of coalitions,
R4 maximize the involvement of each individual agent in the
coalitions.
4 Conviviality measures
In multiagent systems, conviviality has been evaluated by
measuring the interdependencies among the agents [4]. In this
section, we use the static conviviality measures presented in
[4], that we call static case. We extend these measures by
proposing new ones, that we call temporal case. The main
challenge in defining conviviality measures over time is to
make assumptions about the sequences. For example, when
modelling the agents’ interdependencies as a sequence of de-
pendence networks, we could leave out one dependence net-
work from a sequence, or introduce multiple copies of the same
dependence network. How this affects the conviviality and its
evaluation depends on the underlying assumptions.
4.1 Static Case
The basic idea for the conviviality measures introduced in [4],
is the following. Since the atomic structure reflecting convivi-
ality is a pair of reciprocating agents, the conviviality mea-
sures should also be based on the pairing relations in the de-
pendence networks. Hence, for each pair of agents, the num-
ber of cycles that contains this pair is counted. Furthermore,
the measures introduced in [4] were normalized to be in [0, 1]
in order to allow the sensible comparison of any two depen-
dence networks in terms of conviviality. Equation 1 is the
general formula to express the pairwise conviviality measure
conv(DN) of a dependence network.
conv(DN) =
∑
coal(a, b)
Ω
, (1)
where coal(a, b) for any distinct a, b ∈ A is the number of
cycles that contain both a and b in DN and Ω is the maximum
the sum in the numerator can get, over a dependence network
of the same set of goals and the same number of agents but
with all possible dependencies.
To compare the conviviality of each of the three steps
in TDNk of Figure 2, using the measure of Equation 1,
we would just have to count the pairs of agents that be-
long to cycles, since the denominator Ω is the same for
all three steps. In TDN1k there are two pairs participat-
ing in a cycle: (A,B), (B,A), in TDN2k , four pairs of
agents: (B,C), (C,B), (C,D), (D,C) and in TDN3k six pairs:
(A,E), (E,A), (B,E), (E,B), (D,E), (E,D). This makes the
third step more convivial than the first two.
4.2 Temporal Case
Conviviality in Temporal Dependence Network can be mea-
sured on at least two separate scales: the micro organiza-
tional and the macro-organizational scales. Measurements at
the macro-organizational scale focus on the evaluation and
comparison of the conviviality measures of each step in the se-
quence of dependence networks, whereas micro-organizational
measurement reflects topological aspects within each depen-
dence network. We consider three measurement principles:
Principle 1 (Dominance) A temporal dependence network
has more conviviality than another one if, ceteris paribus, each
individual dependence network of the former has more convivi-
ality than the corresponding (same sequence number) individ-
ual dependence network of the latter. This is a combination
of R1 and R2 from the single transition case.
Principle 2 (Volatility) A temporal dependence network
has more conviviality than another one if, ceteris paribus, the
conviviality measures of all individual dependence networks in
the former shows less volatility than in the latter.
Principle 3 ((Micro-organizational) Entropy) A tem-
poral dependence network has higher conviviality than another
one if, ceteris paribus, the dependence topology in the former
shows more variations than in the latter, i.e., if the agents
have the opportunity to interact in a greater variety of coali-
tions.
For instance, when we state our Principle 1, Dominance,
we compare conviviality measures of each step in the se-
quence of dependence networks, thus a measure at the macro-
organizational is done. The same holds when we say that the
conviviality measures should be equally distributed (Princi-
ple 2, Volatility). In contrast, to be able to compare the en-
tropy within two sequences of temporal dependence networks,
and evaluate the R.4, i.e., maximize the involvement of each
individual agent in the coalitions, we need to study the tem-
poral dependence network at a micro-organizational scale.
4.2.1 Macro-organizational scale
To illustrate our Dominance Principle, we return to our run-
ning example. Consider two instances of the game: l and k.
The same five players, Alice, Bob, Carlo, Dimitra and Eve,
are trying to improve their conviviality. Indeed, in game l they
considered that they did poorly. They play a second game k
and compare their performance with the first one. Figure 3
illustrates the Dominance Principle with these two games.
A B
CD
E
(a) TDN1
k
A B
CD
E
(b) TDN2
k
A B
CD
E
(c) TDN3
k
A B
CD
E
(a) TDN1
l
A B
CD
E
(b) TDN2
l
A B
CD
E
(c) TDN3
l
Figure 3. Illustration of Dominance.
The first game l, represented by the temporal dependence
network TDNl has more conviviality than the second, repre-
sented by TDNk. In each corresponding phase of the game,
there are more interactions among the agents in game l than
in game k. For example, in phase 1, three agents from game l
interact, namely A,D and B, to form two coalitions, whereas
in the same phase, only two agents from game k interact,
namely A and B, to form a single coalition.
We now introduce our fine-grained conviviality measures
for temporal dependence networks. Let TDN1 and TDN2 be
two temporal dependence networks.
Let |TDN1| and |TDN2| be the length of these temporal de-
pendence networks, i.e., the number of steps in the sequences.
Let |A1| and |A2| be the number of agents in TDN1 and
TDN2 respectively. We recall that |A1| and |A2| are constant
over the individual dependence networks Let TDN ji denote
the j-th individual dependence network of the temporal de-
pendence networks TDNi.
Definition 4.1 (Dominance, formally) Let
|TDN1| = |TDN2|. If ∀TDN j1 conv(TDN j1 ) ≥ conv(TDN j2 ),
then conv(TDN1) ≥ conv(TDN2).
For each instance of TDNl in Figure 3, the corresponding
instance of TDNk, containing the same agents and goals, has
less cycles. This makes TDNl overally more convivial.
Similarly as in the static case represented Figure 1, we can
assume, for our example, that each cycle consists of the same
two goals reciprocation in any given individual dependence
network. For instance, illustrated Figure 3, in TDN2k , C de-
pends on B and reciprocally, to ask and answer question, sim-
ilarly C depends on D and reciprocally. This reflects the fact
that the game is turn based, and all players have similar goals
at a given phase of the game (i.e., in a given individual de-
pendence network step). Then, there are a total of 2 goals
in each individual dependence network of our examples (Fig-
ure 3 to Figure 5). The following are then constant over all the
computation section for each individual dependence network:
• Agents = {A,B,C,D,E},
• Goals = {“ask a question′′, “reply to a question′′},
• Ω = 6320.
The conviviality computation of each individual dependence
network step displayed on Figure 3 is presented in Table 1. For
instance, the conviviality of TDNk is explained in Paragraph
4.1. We see that the computed conviviality for each individual
dependence network is higher in TDNl than in TDNk. In
each phase of the game, the players have more interactions.As
a conclusion and per Dominance Principle, TDNl has more
conviviality than TDNk.
Table 1. Computations for TDNk and TDNl.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
conv(TDN1k) =
2
Ω conv(TDN
2
k) =
4
Ω conv(TDN
3
k) =
6
Ω
conv(TDN1l ) =
4
Ω conv(TDN
2
l ) =
6
Ω conv(TDN
3
l ) =
8
Ω
We illustrate our second Principle Volatility, corresponding
to our Requirement R3, by comparing a previous instance of
the game, namely k with a new one m, in which agents have
had the same number of interactions to answer Q1 in phase 1
and Q3 in phase 3, but no reciprocal interaction to address Q2
in phase two. Figure 4 illustrates this case. The temporal de-
pendence network TDNk has more conviviality than TDNm.
In game k, players change their interactions more gradually
over the three phases, whereas changes in game m are more
erratic, going from many interactions in phase 1 to no inter-
action in phase 2, to many interactions again in phase 3.
We use the notion of standard deviation σ, which reflects
the volatility in a set of measures. A low standard deviation
indicates that data points tend to be very close to the mean,
whereas high standard deviation indicates that the data is
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Figure 4. Illustration of Volatility.
spread out over a large range of values. We note σ(TDNi) the
standard deviation over the individual dependence networks
belonging to the temporal dependence network TDNi. We
also need to fix the conviviality mean of TDN1 and TDN2,
respectively noted µ(TDN1) and µ(TDN2).
Definition 4.2 (Volatility, formally) Let
|TDN1| = |TDN2|, and µ(TDN1) = µ(TDN2).
If σ(TDN1) < σ(TDN2), then
conv(TDN1) > conv(TDN2).
Even if the two temporal dependence networks of Figure
4 have the same mean value for conviviality, 4
Ω
, the stan-
dard variation of TDNk is less than the standard variation of
TDNm. This means that the conviviality of TDNk changes
more gradually and therefore TDNk is more convivial. The
intuition for this principle is that volatility and dependency
are two conflicting notions.
To evaluate the conviviality of the temporal dependence
networks depicted Fig. 4, we first compute conviviality for
each individual dependence network step, presented Table 2.
Table 2. Computations for TDNm and TDNk, Fig. 4.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
TDN1m =
6
Ω TDN
2
m = 0 TDN
3
m =
6
Ω
TDN1k =
2
Ω TDN
2
k =
4
Ω TDN
3
k =
6
Ω
Table 3 presents the means and the standard distribu-
tion, showing that TDNk is more convivial than TDNm, as
σ(TDNm) > σ(TDNk).
Table 3. Means and standard distribution.
Game m Game k
Means µ(TDNm) =
4
Ω µ(TDNk) =
4
Ω
St. dist. σ(TDNm) =
√
8
Ω2
σ(TDNk) =
√
8
3×Ω2
4.2.2 Micro-Organizational Scale
Figure 5 illustrates Entropy : TDNi is more convivial than
TDNj . In game i, players change partners more often, allow-
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Figure 5. Illustration of Entropy.
ing all players to interact, whereas in game j the same players
interact with each other and one player is never involved.
Let δT be the number of different coalitions over all steps
in the sequences of the temporal dependence network T .
Definition 4.3 (Entropy, formally) Let
|TDN1| = |TDN2|, and µ(TDN1) = µ(TDN2), and
σ(TDN1) = σ(TDN2).
If δ1 > δ2, then coal(TDN1) > coal(TDN2).
In Figure 5, none of the two temporal dependence networks
TDNj and TDNi is dominant or less volatile. However, in
TDNj the same coalitions exist throughout the game, whereas
in TDNi, different coalitions are formed and consequently
more players have the ability to participate, contribute and
benefit. Therefore, TDNi is more convivial.
Table 4. Entropy, Fig. 5.
µ(TDNj) =
4
Ω σ(TDNj) = 0 δTDNj = 2
µ(TDNi) =
4
Ω σ(TDNi) = 0 δTDNi = 6
Remark: this principle may lead to unexpected results since
only the number of coalitions is taken into account (and not
their length). If we limit ourself to coalitions of length 2, the
above is sufficient. A further study is needed to understand
the impact of this principle on coalitions with random lengths.
4.2.3 Discussion
In this section we define conviviality measures that satisfy the
four requirements we distinguish and the three principles for
our conviviality measures, and illustrate them with our run-
ning example. Our measures build up to allow the agents to
compare their performances and increase their conviviality.
Our first measures allow agents to compare their conviviality
at each step of the game. However, these measures do not re-
flect the distribution of conviviality over the whole sequence,
which is what our second measures provide. On the other
hand, these second measures do not provide any insight on
which agents cooperate to ensure individual agents’ partici-
pation, which is addressed by our third measure.
5 Related research
In this paper, we use the notion of social dependence intro-
duced by Castelfranchi [7]. Moreover, we build on the notion
of dependence graphs and dependence networks, elaborated
by Conte and Sichman [20], and Conte et al. [21], in order to
model and measure conviviality.
By contrast, we use a more abstract representation of de-
pendence networks, i.e., abstracting notions such as tasks,
actions or plans. In this sense our approach also builds to
Sauro’s abstractions in [15], Boella et al. [2].Dependence based
coalition formation is analyzed by Sichman [19], while other
approaches are developed in [17, 11, 1].
Differently from Grossi and Turrini [12], our approach does
not bring together coalitional theory and dependence theory
in the study of social cooperation within multiagent systems.
Moreover, our approach differs as it does not hinge on agree-
ments. Finally, similarly to works such as in Johnson and
Bradshaw et al. “coactive” design [14], we emphasize agents’
interdependence as a critical feature of multiagent systems.
Addtionally, the authors focus on the design of systems in-
volving joint interaction among human-agent systems .
6 Summary
In agents systems, conviviality measures quantify interdepen-
dence in social dependence relations, representing the degree
to which the system facilitates social interactions. In this pa-
per, we distinguish static from temporal measures. In the
static case, roughly, more interdependence increases convivi-
ality among groups of agents, i.e., coalitions, whereas larger
coalitions may decrease the efficiency or stability of these in-
volved coalitions. In the temporal case, we consider sequences
of dependence networks over time.
We distinguish four requirements to maximize conviviality
in a multiagent system: 1) maximize the size of the agent’s
coalitions; 2) maximize the number of these coalitions; 3)
maximize the regular increment of the number of coalitions;
and 4) maximize the involvement of each individual agent in
the coalitions. Furthermore, we distinguish three principles
to guide our definition of conviviality measures: dominance,
volatility, and entropy. Finally, we define conviviality mea-
sures that can be used to test our requirements following our
three principles, and illustrate them with a gaming example.
A topic of further work is to define measures of temporal
dependence networks for other interpretation of the temporal
sequence, and to define conviviality measures for dynamic nor-
mative dependence networks. The difference between the two,
is that in the latter, a normative system mechanism is used
to change conviviality by changing social dependencies, for
example by creating new obligations, hiding power relations
and social structures. This has been used to define convivial-
ity masks [6], and thus the measures of dynamic dependence
networks will lead to measures of conviviality masks. How-
ever, we expect that the proposed measures do not apply in
a straightforward way, but that new measures will be needed
to capture further views of conviviality.
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